How Nintendo Was Hacked: A Retrospective from Game Boy to Switch

The Dawn of Flash Cartridges

Paradoxically, the very first manufacturers of flash cartridges for Nintendo handheld consoles were... Nintendo themselves. Or rather, their partner Intelligent Systems Co., Ltd. - a company founded in 1986 that effectively became an internal division of Nintendo in 1987.

In 1989, Intelligent Systems released the first Game Boy development kit - DMG-ICE. It included an emulator, debugger, and flash cartridges for recording game builds. However, the kit was strictly professional - and cost about $7,000.

Since we're talking about flash cartridges, let's clarify the difference between them and regular cartridges. It's actually simple: a regular cartridge contains ROM - a chip where the game is written once at the factory. A flash cartridge, unlike it, allows multiple rewrites - like a memory card but in cartridge format.

This was critical for developers. You can't develop a game and order new cartridges with the current build each time - the process would take years.

So Nintendo created flash cartridges first - albeit not for consumers, but exclusively for internal use.

Game Boy and Game Boy Color: First Harbingers of the Coming Storm

The first flash cartridges for Game Boy appeared during the Game Boy Color era - back in 1998. And interestingly, their emergence wasn't tied to any technical breakthroughs by hackers. It all started with Nintendo themselves.

In November 1996, Lawson (a Japanese convenience store chain) announced a project called Game Kiosk. As part of this project, Loppi machines were to appear in stores where you could buy a game and immediately write it to a special flash cartridge. Initially, this concerned Nintendo 64, not handhelds.

Loppi machine

If Nintendo had known what opening this Pandora's box would lead to, they might have tried to shut down Lawson before the announcement. But they liked the idea: in those years, the company was seriously trying to combat the secondary market - where users resold used games.

The main problem was one thing: flash cartridges are so easy to create that this idea was a gift for pirates.

Essentially, a flash cartridge is just a board with three chips and rewrite capability. The reader - yes, that still needed to be developed and programmed, but the cartridges themselves? Almost anyone could make them. Literally - a task at the level of a school electronics club.

So Nintendo themselves threw the idea of flash cartridges onto the market. And the market didn't keep them waiting.

Hong Kong company Bung Enterprises, previously specializing in devices for hacking home consoles, immediately pivoted to handhelds and released GB Xchanger - one of the first mass-produced pirate flash cartridges.

Besides the ease of creating such cartridges, there was another problem - console protection. It was, to put it mildly, symbolic. The console at startup compared the Nintendo logo stored in BIOS with the logo in the cartridge memory. If they matched - the game launched. If not - black screen.

And here you're probably asking: "That's all the protection?"

Yes. And the trick is that this was legal protection, not technical. A pirate copying a cartridge inevitably copied the Nintendo logo too. So Nintendo could sue for unauthorized use of the trademark - without even needing to figure out who owned the rights to the game itself.

Interestingly, even Nintendo themselves released their own flash cartridge for Game Boy in 2000 - the Nintendo Power project.

This was the only case when the company officially sold a flash cartridge for their handheld systems. Yes, there was also Chinese iQue, but that operated almost autonomously and within a different legal framework.

Of course, initially the selection of flash cartridges was modest - GB Xchanger, GB Transferer, E-Merger and e-Card. But the genie was out of the bottle: there was no putting it back.

Game Boy Advance: When Flash Cartridges Got Out of Control

In March 2001, Nintendo released Game Boy Advance. And just two months later - in May - the first flash cartridge appeared: Flash Advance.

The time between console release and first pirate cartridges shrank from nine years (in the original Game Boy era) to two months. The reason - Nintendo barely strengthened the protection. Moreover, the cartridge design itself became simpler.

In original Game Boy and Game Boy Color, there was a special controller between the processor and memory - MBC (Memory Bank Controller). Its task was managing memory bank switching: when the processor requested "Show bank number 5", MBC switched the needed ROM or RAM area into address space.

In Game Boy Advance, this "secretary" disappeared. The processor got direct memory access - without intermediary chips. This became the main simplification: now the cartridge was just a set of flash memory chips, without any internal logic.

Yes, structurally the cartridge became slightly more complex - more contacts and new wiring appeared. But the logic was simplified to a minimum. This is exactly why Flash Advance appeared so quickly.

Nintendo had already managed to shut down Bung through courts by that time, but this stopped no one. Flash cartridge production went semi-underground - and importantly, in some countries it didn't even violate local laws.

And then the real bacchanalia began. Everyone realized: you can earn money quickly, simply and massively on flash cartridges.

These cartridges began multiplying like mushrooms after rain:

EZ-Flash - the first cartridge from a developer under the pseudonym Borden

Then company Xinga copied the idea and released XG-Flash.

Then Borden... went to work for Xinga.

Soon EFA cartridges appeared (Extreme Flash Advance).

The dam burst. By the most conservative estimates, over a hundred different flash cartridge models were released for GBA.

And notably: flash cartridges for GBA are still being produced today - and enjoy steady popularity.

EZ-Flash company is still alive and recently released EZ-Flash Definitive Edition - perhaps the best flash cartridge for Game Boy Advance ever.

It seems that at this moment Nintendo realized things couldn't continue like this.

Flash cartridges were multiplying uncontrollably, legal protection wasn't working, and the hardware was being hacked literally on a kitchen table. And then the company seriously considered real protection for the first time. The result wasn't long in coming - with the release of Nintendo DS, everything changed.

Nintendo DS: Protection Worth Just One Line of Code?

In December 2004, Nintendo introduced their answer to PlayStation Portable - Nintendo DS. The console was entirely new in every way: dual screens, touch controls, redesigned architecture. And importantly, for the first time in handheld history, Nintendo seriously considered protection.

The DS architecture included two processors: ARM9 for games and ARM7 for encryption and backward compatibility. When launching a game, the console verified the cartridge's authenticity using a built-in key and signature embedded in ROM. If verification passed - the game launched. If not - the user saw a blank screen.

In theory - beautiful. In practice - by February 2005, just months after release, a hacker nicknamed DarkFader ran the first homebrew game on the console.

The problem was trivial: Nintendo didn't protect the executable file address in the cartridge. Using a modified board, one could use an original cartridge as a "pass" while loading games from a Game Boy Advance flash cartridge.

DarkFader's device was quite bulky. But Natrium42 simplified the design, and Lynx established small-scale production. Thus PassMe was born - an intermediate adapter inserted into the Nintendo DS slot alongside an original cartridge. It simply replaced the game address, allowing games to launch from a flash cartridge in the GBA slot. The name - "pass me" - perfectly reflected its purpose.

The first PassMe only ran homebrew. But by July 2005, NeoFlash emerged - the first commercial solution capable of running commercial games too. It came with an industrially produced device, not a makeshift PassMe.

Soon, a wave of similar devices flooded the market. Nintendo resisted with firmware updates and modified BIOS, but this only spurred PassMe 2 - a more advanced version working even on updated consoles.

Then came NoPass - eliminating the need for original cartridges. They mimicked licensed games, passed verification themselves, and launched ROMs from GBA flash cartridges.

Cartridges evolved before our eyes. By August 2006, DS-Xtreme hit the market - the first true flash cartridge requiring no workarounds.

It was followed by AceKard, CycloDS, N-Card and many others.

But the real revolution was R4.

Previous devices were expensive: NeoFlash - €240, DS-Xtreme - from $125. R4 offered the same... for $30. Convenience, availability and low price did their job. R4 clones multiplied rapidly.

By my estimates, total DS flash cartridges approach two hundred models.

Nintendo lost this battle again but aimed to recover with Nintendo DSi.

Nintendo DSi: First Steps in Cryptography

With DSi's 2008 launch, Nintendo introduced real cryptographic protection to handhelds for the first time. Where original DS games launched without real authentication, now things changed dramatically.

Every cartridge running in DSi mode needed an RSA signature created with Nintendo's private key. At launch, the console verified this signature using a built-in public key. If even one byte in the header was altered - the game wouldn't launch.

But protection didn't stop there. DSi introduced a white-list - trusted game IDs hardcoded in firmware. Even valid signatures didn't guarantee launch: if the ID wasn't listed - the game was blocked. Importantly, the list could be updated via firmware, which Nintendo actively used to block unofficial or suspicious cartridges.

Paradoxically, almost no physical DSi cartridges were released. Most games were distributed via the online store. Nearly half of all physical DSi releases were cartridges never sold retail - like Nintendo DSi XL Demo Video, meant solely for store demo kiosks. So few physical DSi cartridges were produced.

Additionally, DSi strictly separated compatibility modes: old DS cartridges only ran in DS mode, without access to new features - like the camera, SD card and increased CPU speed. This meant DS-era flash cartridges still worked but were functionally limited.

These measures killed universal DSi flash cartridges. Creating new devices transformed from amateur tinkering into serious engineering requiring cryptanalysis and exploits.

Most old cartridge makers switched focus: they sought game exploits to at least run old DS ROMs bypassing protection. Full DSi flash cartridges were out of the question.

Still, the first (and only) DSi "flash cartridge" came from CycloDS team.

But it resembled an exploit shell more than a true flash cartridge. It shipped empty: users had to download a special utility from the manufacturer's site, configure firmware and upload game images. Compatibility was weak, interface strange, and the project remained between "hacking" and "commercial failure".

In early 2011 came a more interesting approach - Sudokuhax. As the name suggests, it exploited a vulnerability in the official Sudoku game. This exploit let users run DSi software directly from SD cards.

But this wasn't full hacking either. First, the exploit required manual activation each launch. Second, it didn't give full system control - just partial bypass.

Then came the main event preventing full DSi hacking: Nintendo 3DS launched that same year. Almost all hacker and flash cartridge maker attention immediately shifted to the new platform. DSi was left behind - half-hacked, half-forgotten.

The first full custom firmware for DSi only arrived in 2017. Ironically, it became possible thanks to 3DS: through 3DS vulnerabilities, full NAND access was achieved, finally bypassing DSi's cryptographic protection.

Nintendo 3DS: The Most Epic Failure

In 2011, Nintendo introduced perhaps their most technologically ambitious handheld - Nintendo 3DS. A device displaying glasses-free 3D images seemed like magic compared to competitors. But the real trick wasn't this - Nintendo invested enormous effort into hack-proofing the system.

Unlike DSi relying on digital signatures and white-lists, 3DS featured full hardware-software security. Every component - from bootloader and system ROM to cartridge cryptography - worked in a chain-of-trust. Cartridges got encrypted headers tied to hardware keys only Nintendo knew. ROMs used AES encryption, and cartridges employed non-standard reading protocols.

For the first time in handheld history, Nintendo had regularly updated firmware tightly integrated with eShop and online services. This allowed quick vulnerability patches, unsigned app blocking and exploit prevention. Any modification breaking cryptographic integrity immediately blocked booting. Protection seemed solid, and it held for two full years - a Nintendo record.

To outsiders, nothing appeared to happen during those two years.

But behind the scenes, much occurred. For example, in 2012 the community raised $2300 for 3DS chip decapping... and the organizer vanished with the money. Minor exploits periodically surfaced, but none gave real system control. Everything seemed stable.

Then in late 2013, the dam broke.

Gateway arrived - the first flash cartridge truly cracking 3DS.

Gateway instantly became a hit, as it actually ran Nintendo 3DS games.

But technically, it wasn't quite a flash cartridge. It used custom firmware, with the cartridges (blue and red) merely launching the exploit and verifying authenticity. This scheme proved vulnerable - and Gateway soon had many clones.

Things got more interesting when Govanify appeared... hacking another developer's (Ermilos) computer and stealing a firmware build. Then adding spy telemetry to collect user console data.

After removing backdoors, this build became Palantine CFW - no longer requiring cartridges at all.

By late 2014 came the first true 3DS flash cartridge - Sky3DS.

It genuinely passed console verification as an original cartridge - no exploits needed. But this became its weakness: it couldn't bypass region locks, run homebrew, or offer flexibility. Sky3DS worked, but like a regular cartridge - ultimately losing to custom firmware.

The real hacker victory came not from hardware - but a single bootloader line vulnerability.

Nintendo made a fatal Boot9 bootrom error - immutable memory baked into the console chip. Firmware couldn't update it, so once flawed, it stayed flawed forever. In 2017, hackers published SigHax, running unsigned firmware by forging digital signatures as Nintendo-approved. The console accepted them as legitimate - granting full system access. The vulnerability was literally silicon-etched, making it unfixable - Nintendo could only watch.

Finding this hole required a long journey: buying old 3DS units, extracting factory firmware, analyzing signature parsers and brute-forcing nearly 80 trillion variants to find a working signature forgery. This number highlights the madness: even knowing the vulnerability, hacking demanded massive computational resources and precise bootloader structure understanding. All to bypass one critical line - gaining full system control.

From this moment, Nintendo 3DS officially joined fully hacked consoles. No patches, firmware updates or even New Nintendo 3DS revisions helped.

Now it's time for Nintendo Switch.

Nintendo Switch - Same Mistakes, Only Faster

Nintendo built Switch's complex protection: hardware cryptography, TrustZone, encryption at every stage, component verification, constant updates and network control. It seemed like a digital fortress built to last centuries.

But they forgot one thing: fortresses are meaningless if the front door stays open.

This door was RCM - recovery mode built into Nvidia Tegra X1. Not a vulnerability itself - a legitimate debug function left for servicing. But inside lurked a bootrom bug - immutable memory silicon-etched into the chip. Thus Fusée Gelée was born: an exploit running before all security. One bridged contact - and protection became irrelevant.

The scene exploded. Atmosphère, Hekate, custom bootloaders, emulators, pirate shops and mods appeared. Switch wasn't just hacked - it became a platform for scene development, not containment.

Nintendo tried salvaging the situation: new revisions patched the vulnerability. But it wasn't enough. RCM couldn't be removed without chip redesign, so bypassing protection was just a matter of time.

Imagine RCM as a locked room inside the chip. Old revisions left the door slightly ajar. Just touching the handle (or bridging a contact with a paperclip) let anyone enter and do anything.

Later, realizing their mistake, Nintendo and Nvidia "locked" this door - with a secure digital lock. But it was too late: an unlocked window remained nearby. Entry became harder, but not impossible.

All that was needed - a ladder to reach the window. This ladder became the mod-chip: a small device giving the scene the same capabilities, just differently - via side memory access and code execution interception.

With reliable mod-chips, one thing became clear: Switch had fully joined the hacked console club.

And right at lifecycle's end came Switch's first true flash cartridge - Mig-Switch.

Like with 3DS, this wasn't innovative - just old solution emulation. Mig-Switch mimicked original cartridges - no protection bypass, no bonuses, no flexibility. Given mod-chips offered more for less money, Mig-Switch didn't catch on. Its sole advantage was no soldering required.

More interesting: Mig-Switch likely emerged thanks to GigaLeak data. Protection was too complex to bypass otherwise.

Attempts to revive flash cartridges seemed archaic rituals: expensive devices with fewer features - in an era where everything already worked via software.

Nintendo lost again. Not from lack of effort. But from betting on the wrong things. The most secure console became the fastest hacked - again due to one unsecured entry built into its foundation.

Epilogue

Friends, we've traced Nintendo handheld hacking's full journey - from flash cartridges to mod-chips, from legal loopholes to cryptographic disasters. It all boils down to four simple conclusions painting a less-than-rosy outlook.

First, creating full flash cartridges without leaked confidential data is now impossible. Protection standards reached levels where even simple cartridge hardware copying requires either internal documentation or massive hacking.

Second, if hacking chances exist - they're in hardware. Mod-chips don't need miracles, just time, soldering and some audacity. They break systems before they can say "no".

Third, backward compatibility remains the weakest link. Hackers know old code hides forgotten trapdoors best - especially when running new systems on legacy foundations.

Fourth, waiting for soft-hacks is like waiting for manna from heaven. Yes, it's happened. But almost always from fundamental, glaring errors. Relying on this isn't strategy - it's lottery.

Nintendo builds ever-higher walls, ever-complex locks, yet the community always finds ways inside. Whether walls fall is just a matter of time.